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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
LEGAL REALISM

WILLIAM E. NELSON*
We are here today to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v.
Board of Education,1 surely the most important case decided in the Twentieth
Century by the Supreme Court of the United States. Over the past halfcentury, Brown has come to “[define] the central values of constitutional
adjudication in the United States.”2 It has even been called “the single most
honored opinion in the Supreme Court’s [entire] corpus.”3
There are many reasons not merely to commemorate but even to celebrate
Brown. The most salient is that the Court’s decision marked the beginning of
the end of the heinous system of formal de jure segregation of blacks from
whites that had prevailed throughout the South for some three quarters of a
century.4 Segregation had grown up in the aftermath of Reconstruction as a
means to keep the former slaves in a condition of subordination.5 Whatever
doubts might have existed about its legality were erased when the Supreme
Court declared in Plessy v. Ferguson that separate facilities for AfricanAmericans were constitutional as long as they were physically equal to
facilities for whites.6 In fact, they almost never were. Indeed, both before and
after Plessy, segregation had the purpose and effect of “constantly pushing the
Negro farther down.”7

* Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., Hamilton College, 1962;
J.D., New York University, 1965; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1971. The author is indebted to his
colleagues in the Legal History Colloquium at New York University for their criticisms and
suggestions, as well as to Joel Goldstein and Daniel Hulsebosch of St. Louis University. He is
also indebted for research support to the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty
Research Fund of New York University School of Law.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (1991).
3. Jack M. Balkin, Introduction to WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS
DECISION 4 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
4. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
5. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 22-29 (3d ed. 1974).
6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-52 (1896).
7. WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 108. See generally id. at 97-109.
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Thirteen years later, with the founding of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),8 blacks began their slow climb up
the mountain of equality. Another generation passed before Charles Hamilton
Houston reorganized the Howard Law School into a center for the training of
civil rights lawyers.9 Within a few more years, the Supreme Court, in Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, held for the first time that a separate educational
track for African Americans—in this instance, an out-of-state law school—
violated the Equal Protection Clause.10 After several other decisions,11 the five
cases that ultimately were consolidated into Brown v. Board of Education12
and Bolling v. Sharpe13 came before the Court. They were first argued in the
October 1952 Term, put over for reargument to the next term, and finally
decided on May 17, 1954.14 The opinion directing the dismantling of
segregation in the South “with all deliberate speed” was not issued until yet
another year had passed.15 Sixteen years later, the Court affirmed the use of
busing to achieve integration,16 but then, in the 1974 case of Milliken v.
Bradley, it slowed integration efforts by prohibiting busing across municipal
and school district boundaries.17 The result of all these cases is that de jure
segregation is unconstitutional and Southern schools are no longer totally
segregated, as they were a half-century ago.18 But residential segregation and
all its untoward consequences are worse than ever, particularly in Northern
cities.19 Thus, while there is reason for celebration, the celebration should be
somewhat restrained. Brown put an end to an era of wicked law, but it failed
to end racism, as many of us in the trenches during the past five decades had
hoped it would.
Brown v. Board of Education also “contributed,” to quote Mark Tushnet,
“to the development of a pervasive ‘rights consciousness’ among the people of

8. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at 1 (1987).
9. See id. at 30-31, 35-36.
10. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 306 U.S. 337, 352 (1938).
11. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631
(1948).
12. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486.
13. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
14. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 488.
15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
16. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
17. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974).
18. For statistics on the first two decades of desegregation in public schools in the South, see
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
345-47 (1991).
19. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION

797

the United States generally.”20 Brown was the first case in which the Supreme
Court struck down numerous laws of many states in order to protect individual
civil, as distinguished from economic, rights. Baker v. Carr21 and the Warren
Court’s criminal procedure revolution22 followed, and by the end of the 1960s
people had begun to expect that the courts, rather than other institutions, would
protect their constitutional rights. Roe v. Wade23 and Lawrence v. Texas24 are
both an outgrowth and a confirmation of that expectation. More deeply,
Americans of all groups, as a result of Brown, have grown to understand that
they have rights and that those rights can be enforced through law. Most of us
think that this “rights consciousness” is a cause for celebration.
Finally, Brown v. Board of Education marked the birth of the Supreme
Court’s claim, first announced four years later in Cooper v. Aaron25 and
brought to fruition in recent decisions of the Rehnquist Court,26 that the Court,
in the words of my colleague Larry Kramer, should be the “sovereign” and not
simply the “supreme” interpreter of the Constitution.27 Cooper, which
“declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution,” told all state officials that they had
no power to ignore or reject the Supreme Court’s holding in Brown and,
indeed, that their oaths bound them to enforce it.28 Some forty years later, City
of Boerne v. Flores informed members of Congress that, despite Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, they too had no power to ignore or reject the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and, indeed, that
their oaths bound them to enforce it.29 Bush v. Gore30 fully displayed the
Court’s belief in its primacy over the other branches of government, as have
the federalism cases culminating in United States v. Morrison.31 Proponents of
20. Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 2, at 1867.
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
22. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
398-99 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 654-55 (1961).
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
25. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
26. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 128-69
(2001).
27. Id. at 13. The words Kramer uses are “sovereignty” and “supremacy,” not “sovereign”
and “supreme.” Id.
28. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
29. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997).
30. 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
31. 529 U.S. 598, 616-17 n.7 (2000); see also Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 365 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). But see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972,
1981-82 (2003). For a general discussion of these cases, see Kramer, supra note 26, at 137-58
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a robustly empowered Supreme Court—and there will be many among the
readers of this Article—can find cause for celebration here as well, even if they
do not agree with all of the substantive results the Court has reached.
These matters of celebration, however, are not my subject. Indeed, Brown
v. Board of Education itself is not my subject. What I plan to address is a shift
in emphasis in the jurisprudence of legal realism—a shift that is connected to
Brown but obviously more complex than Brown.
Let me define my topic from the bottom up. Throughout the Twentieth
Century, the legal academy has fixated on the death of formalism, the birth of
legal realism, and the triumph of the latter over the former during the New
Deal’s constitutional revolution of 1937.32 I have no doubt that the change
from formalism to realism occurred and that the change was important. The
legal realists have dominated the jurisprudential landscape of America since
the 1930s.
But it is a mistake to view realism as a phenomenon that thereafter did not
change, as most scholars have done.33 An important intellectual move on the
part of those who see realism as such a phenomenon has been to distinguish it
from a predecessor movement, known as sociological jurisprudence. Again, I
do not doubt that sociological jurisprudence and realism can be understood as
different phenomena,34 although I agree with Morton Horwitz that the

and Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003).
32. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 175-76, 208-25 (1998);
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213-36 (1995); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS
OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-94 (1973);
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 13-32 (2000); G. Edward White,
The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L.
REV. 279, 279-82 (1973).
33. The Transformation of American Law is the only scholarship that analyzes in depth how
legal realism did change over the course of the decades since 1930. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169268 (1992). As the pages that follow will show, I agree with Horwitz’s analysis in one important
respect. I agree that legal realists can be divided into two groups—first, those who “turn to social
science research [as] a direct extension of pre-war Progressive sociological jurisprudence,” and
second, those who “insist” that law should be grounded in “a better system of political values.”
Id. at 209. But I disagree with him in two respects: (1) I do not think, as I understand Horwitz
does, that both groups have been equally prominent in the realist movement at all times in its
history. Instead, I will argue that those who focused on the relation between law and society were
dominant until the 1950s, especially in the judiciary, while those concerned with political values
became dominant thereafter, and (2) unlike Horwitz, I do not believe that the shift from the first
to the second form of realism, which occurred in the 1950s, was entirely a change for the better.
34. For some of the outstanding work that so understands them, see N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE
POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997), LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 1-46 (1986) and G. Edward White, From
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difference is more one of tone and style than of substance.35 My main
objection, however, to drawing a line in 1930 to mark the shift from
sociological jurisprudence to realism is that such a line obscures another—and,
I think, more important—jurisprudential change that occurred in connection
with Brown v. Board of Education. This Article focuses on this later change.
I need to begin by defining a legal realist as anyone, including a
practitioner of sociological jurisprudence,36 who rejects formalism’s faith that
judges can derive results in hard cases deductively from nonpolitical, neutral,
and objective sources of law such as cases and statutes. A realist believes that
judges must bring something else to the table. But what else? Here I need to
draw an overly sharp, analytical distinction. On the one hand, a judge might
see herself as an agent of society who is under a duty to make law conform to
the wishes of society. If such a judge thinks of society as a train, law will
appear as the caboose at the end of the train, and the judge’s job will be to keep
the caboose on the same track as the train. On the other hand, a judge might
see himself as society’s commander. Looking upon society as a train, law will
emerge as the engine, and the judge as the engineer who must determine the
direction that the train ultimately will take.
Of course, law is both an engine and a caboose. Nevertheless, we
sometimes tend to think of it more as one than the other. My hypothesis is that
until Brown, legal thinkers tended to see law as a caboose and the judge as
someone who tidied up and ensured that law was following in the direction
society was leading. Since Brown, our emphasis has shifted, and we now tend
to look upon law more as the engine that will dictate the course society will
take.
Part I of this Article will concentrate on this shift in emphasis betweeen the
1920s and the 1980s in judicial and academic views about law and the nature
of the judicial process. Then, in Part II, I hope to show how the ideas of the
Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early TwentiethCentury America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).
35. See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 169-70, 174, 176, 185. Horwitz takes note of the
impertinence, irreverence, and iconoclasm of the realists while calling “[r]ealism . . . a
continuation of the Progressive attack on the attempt of late-nineteenth-century Classical Legal
Thought to . . . portray law as neutral, natural, and apolitical.” Id. at 170.
36. I actually have no stake in the use of the term “legal realism.” What I do care about is
viewing all antiformalists from the 1920s forward as a single group, so that I can compare the
antiformalism of the 1920s with that of a later era, especially the 1980s, in order to identify a
change in antiformalism that prior scholars have overlooked. My project requires me to treat
what has been called sociological jurisprudence as comparable to what has been called realism in
order to focus on a change in emphasis not directly connected to what others have seen as the
transformation of sociological jurisprudence into realism. A focus on the distinction between
sociological jurisprudence and realism tends to obscure the later change on which I am focusing,
whereas seeing the two movements as part of a larger antiformalist phenomenon makes the 1950s
change about which I care emerge more clearly.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

800

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:795

1920s persisted into the early 1950s, and how the Court’s opinion in Brown
could have been written consistently with those ideas. In Part III, we will see
that Chief Justice Earl Warren did not so write the opinion, and we will
examine how the academy, in response to what he did write, began to articulate
new views about law and judging. My claim will be that the legal academy’s
reaction to Brown undermined a conception of realism inherited from the
1920s—a notion that judges should conform legal doctrine to emerging
societal needs and values. In place of this old conception, a new pluralist
vision emerged, in which judges are expected to infuse the law with their own
personally held, but typically discordant, values of political morality.
Finally, Part IV will analyze why we should, on the one hand, regret and,
on the other hand, applaud this transformation in the concept of realism. I will
argue that the academy’s reaction to Brown moved America away from a
jurisprudence of inherently progressive courts, such as the Warren Court,
toward a deeply fractured legal culture in which conservative courts, such as
the Court that decided Bush v. Gore,37 again have become possible. I view this
change as cause for regret, though others will celebrate it. At the same time,
the infusion of discordant moral values into the law can help discrete and
insular minorities enter the mainstream of American political dialogue. For
me, this development is cause for celebration, but those who celebrate Bush v.
Gore will likely disagree.
I
The Twentieth Century began with what Morton Horwitz has labeled
“[t]he Progressive attack on Classical Legal Thought.”38 In broad outline,
which is all that is required here, the Nineteenth Century’s classical ideal
envisioned a body of nonpolitical, neutral, and objective legal doctrine that
could mediate between the state and society and among contending forces
within society.39 Beginning with Oliver Wendell Holmes in the last decade of
the Nineteenth and the opening decade of the Twentieth Century, progressives
challenged this orthodox view. They argued that law was political and
subjective and that many legal decisionmakers were prejudiced in favor of
corporate entrepreneurs.40 By the 1920s, according to Horwitz, legal realism
had been born.41
But realism has not remained as a constant. Important emphases changed
in the aftermath of Brown. A comparison of two important books—the one

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 4.
See id. at 9-31.
See id. at 109-62.
See id. at 169-70.
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published thirty-three years before Brown,42 and the other published thirty-two
years after43—will illustrate. Both books begin with the fundamental realist
insight that preexisting formal legal materials, especially statutes and judicial
precedents, often do not dictate results.44 Both see law as a policy-oriented
science. But they differ significantly in their understanding of the ultimate
sources from which judges sculpt their policy judgments.
The first book is Benjamin N. Cardozo’s, The Nature of the Judicial
Process.45 For Cardozo, the supreme source of law was “social welfare”46 or
the “welfare of society.”47 Later in his book, Cardozo called his approach “the
method of sociology.”48 Conceding the vagueness of his terminology,49
Cardozo suggested that the method of sociology called upon a judge “‘to
ascertain . . . what ordering of the social life of the community comports best
with the aim of the law in question in the circumstances before him’”50 or with
“the mores of the community,” with its “ethics or . . . social sense of justice,
whether formulated in creed or system, or immanent in the common mind.”51
Cardozo was clear that the “standard” for judges who used the method of
sociology “must be an objective one.”52 Judges were not “free to substitute
their own ideas of reason and justice for those of the men and women whom
they serve.”53 They were not “commissioned to set aside existing rules at
pleasure in favor of any other set of rules which they may hold to be expedient
or wise.”54 When judges were “called upon to say how far existing rules
[were] to be extended or restricted,” their duty was to “let the welfare of
society fix the path, its direction and its distance.”55 Cardozo understood, of
course, that his demand for objectivity provided “no assurance that judges
[would] interpret the mores of their day more wisely and truly than other
men;”56 it demanded only that the judge “shall search for social justice” along
paths fixed by society, not by the policy preferences of the judge.57

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
See CARDOZO, supra note 42, at 14-23, 40-43; DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 24-26.
CARDOZO, supra note 42.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 98-102.
Id. at 71-73.
CARDOZO, supra note 42, at 90 (quoting LORENZ BRUTT, DIE KUNST DER
RECHTSANWENDUNG 57 (1907)).
51. Id. at 72.
52. Id. at 89.
53. Id. at 88-89.
54. Id. at 66-67.
55. CARDOZO, supra note 42, at 67.
56. Id. at 135.
57. Id. at 137.
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This is a lecture about constitutionalism, and some listeners might want me
to say a word about how Cardozo’s writing about common-law adjudication,
expressed in The Nature of the Judicial Process, fit with his constitutional
decision-making. I find the fit nearly perfect. In constitutional as well as
common law cases, Cardozo ultimately gave effect to societal needs and
values. For example, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, Cardozo in dissent
asserted that separation of powers was “not a doctrinaire concept,” but had to
be used with “elasticity of adjustment, in response to the practical necessities
of government.”58 And, in Palko v. Connecticut, he focused on societal
values—on “principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”59
The second book is by Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire.60 Dworkin agrees
with Cardozo that judges must rely on something in addition to precedent, their
conception of judicial role, and their sense of craft in reaching judgments.
Dworkin also agrees that a judge’s task is to interpret society’s values,61 not to
impose her own. But, unlike Cardozo, Dworkin recognizes that society’s
values sometimes will be ambivalent.62 When they are, the judge must point
societal values in one direction rather than in another to make them “the best
these can be.”63 And, in so directing them, the judge must have recourse to
“political morality,”64 not to the societal needs or preferences themselves.
Dworkin argues that right political morality is objectively true and thus
transcends the mere policy preferences of judges. Much of his book consists
of a brilliant analytical attack on what he calls both external and internal
skepticism.65 Dworkin’s claim of objectivity is difficult to maintain, however,
in a constitutional culture that venerates political and religious equality and
pluralism. Jeremy Waldron explains the problem as well as anyone. “A
confident theorist of justice,” Waldron writes:
[Might] announce, . . . “[o]f course, there is disagreement about justice; but . . .
the existence of disagreement is quite compatible with one of the contestant
views being true and the others false.” He can say that, but it is hardly
sufficient, particularly if it is just a prelude to his saying, “And of course the
58. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935).
59. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). I am indebted to John C.P. Goldberg
for these insights about Cardozo’s constitutional cases. See John C.P. Goldberg, Community and
the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing Cardozo’s Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1324 (1990); see also John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419 (1999)
(reviewing ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998)).
60. DWORKIN, supra note 43.
61. See id. at 225, 255.
62. See id. at 255-56.
63. Id. at 255.
64. Id. at 249, 256. I am not alone in so reading Dworkin. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON,
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 203-04 (1999).
65. See DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 31-86.
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true view of justice is my view . . . .” For if he is at all self-aware, he knows
very well that he will be followed, one by one, by his ideological rivals, each
making a similar announcement in similarly self-assured tones. . . . [E]ven
among those who accept the proposition that some views about justice are true
and others false, disagreement will persist as to which is which.66

If Waldron is correct that America’s constitutional pluralism inevitably
means that judges will ground judgments in claims of political morality that
are at war with each other, then we need to understand Dworkin as describing a
jurisprudence in which the differing, individual moral values of judges
legitimately play a role in the process by which they arrive at their decisions.
A judge cannot seriously expect to persuade another judge whose political
morality differs from hers that she is right and he is wrong, although as
political actors we might and, indeed, probably should oppose confirmation of
a judicial nominee with whom we disagree.
This diversion brings me back to what I see as a key difference between
Cardozo and Dworkin.
Cardozo insisted that judges supplement the
professional sources of law with an objectively verifiable analysis of societal
needs and values. Dworkin, on the other hand, would ultimately have judges
work from their disparate views of proper political morality. In Cardozo’s
world, law is intrinsically progressive; because it is a derivative of social fact,
it changes over time in whatever fashion society as a whole progresses over
time. In Dworkin’s world, in contrast, there is room for judges whose political
morality dictates that law should not change or that law should revert to some
previous golden age. Unlinked from the direction of social change, the law can
move in whatever direction those who happen to inhabit the bench succeed in
moving it. Cardozo, in short, saw law as a caboose that should follow
whatever course the societal train takes. Dworkin, in contrast, sees law as an
engine of political morality that can keep the train steady or move it in
whatever direction those at the throttle can command.
II
A.
The Supreme Court created by the New Deal after 1937, of which Cardozo
himself was briefly a member, largely abided by Cardozo’s understanding of
the nature of the judicial process and thus developed into a strong force for
progressive change. The current Court, in contrast, consists not only of
progressives, but also of conservatives who think that law should remain

66. WALDRON, supra note 64, at 3.
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stable67 and reactionaries who would revert to a past golden age.68 What
caused this shift of emphasis in our understanding of how the judiciary should
go about doing its job?
I must concede that the shift is not as sharp as I have so far portrayed it to
be. As early as the late 1930s, Judge Charles Clark urged that judicial
decisions depended not on society’s, but on the individual judge’s “values and
his notions of sound and desirable social policy.”69 Before coming to the
bench, Jerome Frank likewise observed that “[t]he peculiar traits, disposition,
biases and habits of the particular judge will . . . often determine what he
decides to be the law.”70 Karl Llewellyn has often been associated with the
Clark-Frank position as a result of his statement that someone seeking to know
“the true measure of the law” must look, on a case-by-case basis, at “what, in
particular, can or will anybody do about it, here and now.”71
Nonetheless, as I have argued in my recent book on the legal history of
Twentieth-Century New York, Cardozo’s jurisprudential vision remained
dominant into the 1950s.72 One key figure who at least started in agreement
with Cardozo was his colleague, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone. At the same time
that Cardozo was working on The Nature of the Judicial Process, Stone wrote
that “[t]he entire history of our law has been one of change and adaptation to
meet new conditions, social and economic, and to conform to a more
enlightened ethical perception.”73 Three decades later, Henry M. Hart and

67. Justice O’Connor has publicly expressed this view. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472, 2484 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 861-69 (1992).
68. Surely Justice Thomas fits this description, and perhaps Justice Scalia does as well. See
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating a
return to “original understanding”); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38-47 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997)
(arguing for jurisprudence of “original meaning” rather than “living constitution”). In my view,
Justices Scalia and Thomas yearn for the restoration of a hierarchical world in which hierarchy is
grounded in merit, not racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination. In an effort at greater
understanding of their vision, I hope in the future to write a sympathetic portrait of it, even
though ultimately I reject it.
69. Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1939).
70. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 111 (1930).
71. K.N. Llewellyn, Holmes, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 485, 488 (1935). Of course, Holmes
himself had said the same thing. See O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 457 (1897). See generally PURCELL, supra note 32, at 82.
72. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND
IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920–1980, at 142-47 (2001); accord HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 16970, 189-92 (discussing Cardozo as one of a number of legal realists, and arguing that realism had
more in common with, as opposed to differences from, the broader, progressive law reform
efforts of the first third of the Twentieth Century).
73. Harlan F. Stone, The Lawyer and His Neighbors, 4 CORNELL L.Q. 175, 188 (1919).
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Albert M. Sacks, whose The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law74 typically reflected mid-Twentieth-Century jurisprudential
values, cited the famous Warren and Brandeis article on The Right to Privacy75
for the proposition that “‘the common law . . . grows to meet the demands of
society.’”76 Likewise, their mentor, Justice Felix Frankfurter, rejected the view
that a judge should bring his own political morality to bear on decisionmaking. According to Frankfurter, he was “not justified in writing my private
notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish
them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard.”77
At least for a few years, Cardozo’s jurisprudential vision dominated the
Court. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, for one, followed the views of his
junior colleague in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, when he rejected
the claim that “the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which
the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed”
upon it and instead construed it in accordance with “a growing recognition of
public needs.”78 Cardozo’s approach also commanded eight votes in the 1940
case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the first full-scale effort by the
Supreme Court to address the contentious issue of whether Jehovah’s
Witnesses should be compelled to salute the American flag.79 In writing the
opinion for the majority, Justice Frankfurter surely overstated the Cardozian
argument, but that must not cause us to lose sight of the argument’s structure.
It was an argument about societal needs. Following citations of precedent,
Frankfurter said:
The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant
concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of
political responsibilities. . . . In all these cases the general laws in question,
upheld in their application to those who refused obedience from religious
conviction, were manifestations of specific powers of government deemed by
the legislature essential to secure and maintain that orderly, tranquil, and free
society without which religious toleration itself is unattainable. . . . [T]he
question remains whether school children, like the Gobitis children, must be
excused from conduct required of all the other children in the promotion of
national cohesion. We are dealing with an interest inferior to none in the
74. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
75. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
76. HART & SACKS, supra note 74, at 450 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 75, at
193).
77. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
78. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934).
79. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 592-93 (1940).
THE
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hierarchy of legal values. National unity is the basis of national security. To
deny the legislature the right to select appropriate means for its attainment
presents a totally different order of problem from that of the propriety of
subordinating the possible ugliness of littered streets to the free expression of
opinion through distribution of handbills.80

Another case from the same year combined both elements of Cardozo’s
approach. The case was Chambers v. Florida, where the Court, in an opinion
by Justice Hugo Black, invalidated the state’s use of a coerced confession to
obtain a criminal conviction.81 The nation’s need in 1940, as war against
nazism and fascism was brewing, was to define itself as different from
Germany, and courts understood that their job was to articulate the difference
by portraying how America’s developing values differed from those of Nazi
Germany.82 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Hugo Black accordingly
spoke of how “the exalted power of some governments to punish manufactured
crime dictatorially [was] the handmaid of tyranny,”83 and he promised that
American courts would serve as “havens of refuge for those who might
otherwise suffer because they [were] helpless, weak, outnumbered, or . . . nonconforming victims of prejudice and public excitement.”84 Echoes of
Chambers were still being heard four years later in an internal memo that
spoke of the efforts of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund “to have the principles
of the ‘Four Freedoms’ made applicable” in cases pending before the Supreme
Court.85
A fourth case was Korematsu v. United States, where the Court upheld the
validity of an order directing Americans of Japanese ancestry who lived in
specified areas to report for transportation to internment camps.86 Again, the
case was about conforming the law to what the nation needed in wartime. The
Court, in its opinion by Justice Black, said:
[That it could not] “reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities
and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population . . . . We
80. Id. at 594-95. Of course, Gobitis was overruled three years later in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). But the overruling of Gobitis does not
detract from the fact that Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court reflected Cardozo’s approach to
legal realism and that Cardozo’s approach was an important one, if not the only available one, in
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court during the 1940s.
81. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240 (1940).
82. See NELSON, supra note 72, at 121-29; see also AZZA SALAMA LAYTON,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1941–1960, at
39-45 (2000).
83. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241.
84. Id.
85. Memorandum, NAACP Legal Defense Fund (1944), quoted in CHARLES L. ZELDEN, A
FREE AND OPEN BALLOT: SMITH V. ALLWRIGHT AND THE DEMISE OF THE TEXAS ALL WHITE
PRIMARY 128 (forthcoming 2005).
86. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
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cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have
ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national
defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be
taken to guard against it.”
....
In doing so, we are not unmindful of the hardships imposed . . . upon a large
group of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and war is an
aggregation of hardships. . . . Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens
from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is
inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when under
conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the
power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.87

Then there was Dennis v. United States, where the Court upheld the
convictions of members of the Communist Party for conspiring to advocate the
overthrow of the government.88 The main issue in the case was whether the
activities of party members constituted a clear and present danger, and that
depended, in turn, on the meaning of the clear and present danger test.89 Chief
Justice Fred Vinson’s plurality opinion echoed the thoughts of Cardozo and the
earlier opinions we have been examining, notably Gobitis and Korematsu.
According to Vinson, no “shorthand phrase should be crystallized into a rigid
rule to be applied inflexibly.”90 The clear and present danger test, like
separation of powers, was “not a doctrinaire concept,” but had to be used with
“elasticity of adjustment, in response to the practical necessities of
government.”91 “Nothing [was] more certain” for Vinson “than the principle
that there are no absolutes. . . . To those who would paralyze our Government
in the face of impending threat by encasing it in a semantic straitjacket we
must reply that all concepts are relative.”92 Justice Frankfurter, in his
concurring opinion, agreed:
Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such
exceptions would eventually corrode the rules. The demands of free speech in
a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better
served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests . . . than by
announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be
solved.93

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 218-20 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-517 (1953).
Id. at 508.
Id.
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 508.
Id. at 524-25.
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Cardozo’s idea that law should respond to societal needs even appeared in
one of the desegregation cases leading up to Brown, McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents.94 There, the issue was whether an African-American could be
kept separate from other students in a graduate program.95 The Supreme
Court’s answer, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Vinson, was that, as
“[o]ur society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained leaders
increases correspondingly,” a graduate program like the segregated Oklahoma
one that “handicapped” a student “in his pursuit of effective graduate
instruction” that would transform him into “a leader and trainer of others”
would be unconstitutional.96
The persistence through the 1940s of the idea that law should change in
response to societal needs and values also emerges in the writings of those who
criticized it, especially a group of Roman Catholic scholars who were
advancing what they saw as the theological position of their church.97 As these
Catholic scholars argued, legal realists understood that judges decided cases
“not by reference to precedent and principle, but by reference to present or
becoming social customs, institutions, and patterns.”98 Law had only “one
moral measure, Society’s will.”99 According to the Catholics, “no moral
oughts” bound the realists, which led to “a rather disagreeable (ugly)
conclusion”—that “physical force or might makes right.”100 Not surprisingly,
Catholic theorists objected to “a theory that discards moral powers and moral
ought, that eliminates God and soul,” and that “elevates a blind unfolding
dominant social pattern force to the throne of omnipotence.”101 These Roman
Catholic scholars, however, did not hold professorships in the nation’s most
powerful, elite law schools, and accordingly the view that did dominate the
elite schools—that law should change in response to dominant societal
forces—persisted.
The notion that societal forces rather than political morality should dictate
results also surfaced throughout the Supreme Court’s internal discussions of
Brown. In a memorandum that he drafted for his own private purposes, Justice
Felix Frankfurter reiterated his view that:
[I]t is not our duty to express our personal attitudes toward these issues
however deep our individual convictions may be. The opposite is true. It is

94. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
95. Id. at 638.
96. Id. at 641.
97. Edward A. Purcell has done the best work on the critics, especially the Roman Catholic
critics, of legal realism during the 1940s. See PURCELL, supra note 32, at 164-71.
98. Francis E. Lucey, S.J., Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective
Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493, 511 (1942).
99. Karl Kreilkamp, Dean Pound and the End of Law, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 196, 231 (1940).
100. Lucey, supra note 98, at 512.
101. Id. at 513.
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our duty not to express our merely personal views. However passionately any
of us may hold egalitarian views, . . . he travels outside his judicial authority if
for this private reason alone he declares unconstitutional the policy of
segregation.102

Justice Robert Jackson agreed that “we can not oversimplify this decision to be
a mere expression of our personal opinion that school segregation is unwise or
evil. We have not been chosen as legislators but as judges.”103 Jackson’s law
clerk from the term preceding the one in which Brown was decided, the future
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, agreed that, “[i]f this Court, because its
members individually are ‘liberals’ and dislike segregation, now chooses to
strike it down, it differs from the McReynolds court only in the kinds of
litigants it favors and the kinds of special claims it protects.”104
Accordingly, the justices set out in their private thinking to identify the
societal changes that made the abolition of segregation necessary and
appropriate. Justice Frankfurter proclaimed the orthodoxy. In his
memorandum, he declared that equal protection:
[I]s not a fixed formula defined with finality at a particular time. It does not
reflect, as a congealed summary, the social arrangements and beliefs of a
particular epoch. It is addressed to the changes wrought by time and not
merely the changes that are the consequences of physical development. Law
must respond to transformation of views as well as to that of outward
circumstances. The effect of changes in men’s feelings for what is right and
just is equally relevant in determining whether a discrimination denies the
equal protection of the laws.105

Justice Harold H. Burton articulated an equally orthodox, though vague
position. He noted:
[He was] increasingly impressed with the idea that under the conditions of 50
or more years ago it probably could be said that a state’s treatment of negroes,
within its borders, on the basis of “separate but equal” facilities might come
within the constitutional guaranty of an “equal” protection of the laws, because
102. Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter (1953), quoted in RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 684 (1976).
103. Memorandum from Justice Robert Jackson (Feb. 15, 1954), quoted in KLUGER, supra
note 102, at 689.
104. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist (1952 Term), quoted in KLUGER, supra note
102, at 605.
105. Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter (1953), quoted in KLUGER, supra note 102,
at 685. Frankfurter made a similar statement during the initial oral argument of Brown. See
ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952–1955, at 32 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969). For other similar
statements by Frankfurter and others, see Christopher W. Schmidt, The Role of History in Brown
v. Board of Education 17-18 (Nov. 15, 2003) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society for Legal History) (on file with author).
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the lives of negroes and whites were then and there in fact separately cast and
lived. Today, however, I doubt that it can be said in any state (and certainly
not generally) that compulsory “separation” of the races, even with equal
facilities, can amount to an “equal” protection of the laws in a society that is
lived and shared so “jointly” by all races as ours is now.106

At least in a political context, the new Chief Justice, Earl Warren, likewise
would “not shrink from the known needs of social progress.”107
But it was Justice Jackson, as much as anyone on the Court, who strove in
a memorandum circulated only within his own chambers to identify what had
changed in America so as to require that segregation now be outlawed.
Jackson was clear that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had not
intended to outlaw segregation and hence that Plessy v. Ferguson108 was not
necessarily wrongly decided.109 But he also agreed with Cardozo that the
generalities of the Constitution “have a content and a significance that vary
from age to age”110 and thus knew that Plessy and the framers had not bound
his Court. Still, if the Court were to overrule Plessy, “intellectual honesty”111
demanded that it identify factors that could account for the change over time.
What might those factors be?
One such factor was public opinion, which had undergone “profound
change” as a result of the “awful consequences of racial prejudice revealed
by . . . the Nazi regime.”112 A second was education. In the late Nineteenth
Century, education, at one time a privilege for the few, had become “a right
and more than that a duty, to be performed not merely for one’s own advantage
but for the security and stability of the nation.”113 Third, African-Americans
themselves, according to Jackson, had changed. Unlike the late NineteenthCentury freedmen, “who had had no chance ‘to show their capacity for
education or assimilation,’”114 Jackson was convinced that by the midTwentieth Century, “assimilation [was] under way to a marked extent” and that
“the mere fact that one [was] in some degree colored no longer create[d] a

106. Letter from Harold Burton, to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 25, 1952), quoted in
KLUGER, supra note 102, at 610-11.
107. Newspaper Interview with Earl Warren (1952), quoted in KLUGER, supra note 102, at
665.
108. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
109. See KLUGER, supra note 102, at 689.
110. Memorandum from Justice Robert Jackson (Feb. 15, 1954), quoted in KLUGER, supra
note 102, at 689.
111. Id.
112. Memorandum from Justice Robert Jackson (Feb. 15, 1954), quoted in KLUGER, supra
note 102, at 690 (alteration in original).
113. Id.
114. KLUGER, supra note 102, at 690 (quoting Memorandum from Justice Robert Jackson
(Feb. 15, 1954)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION

811

presumption that he [was] inferior, illiterate, retarded or indigent.”115
Jackson’s memorandum thus had some interesting and provocative ideas, but
as Richard Kluger notes, it “left a good deal to be desired as a state paper.”116
It was far removed from becoming an opinion for the Court.
B.
At this point, I should restate one of my main themes—namely, that until
the time Brown v. Board of Education was decided, mainstream American
legal thinkers tended to reject the idea that courts should turn to the political
morality of judges as a basis for deciding cases. Law, instead, usually was
expected to change in response to societal needs and values.
Two outstanding books—one by Robert J. Cottrol, Raymond T. Diamond,
and Leland B. Ware, Brown v. Board of Education: Caste, Culture, and the
Constitution117 and the other by Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights:
Race and the Image of American Democracy118—show that materials existed
in the 1950s to decide Brown consistently with this dominant jurisprudence.
Cottrol, Diamond, and Ware show how “the collective values, tastes,
prejudices, [and] even the reflexes” of American society demanded that
segregation be ended,119 while Dudziak examines how America’s goal of
“promot[ing] democracy among peoples of color around the world was
seriously hampered by continuing racial injustice at home.”120
Cottrol, Diamond, and Ware begin by examining the work of early
Twentieth-Century African-American scholars who, by rejecting thendominant assumptions of white superiority, laid a foundation for subsequent
racial progress.121 World War I was more important, as it showed some two
hundred thousand African-Americans who served in the military as well as the
many more who migrated to Northern cities that the South’s Jim Crow system
was not the inevitable order of things.122 These developments began to bear
fruit during the New Deal, when the administration courted the Northern black
vote and the first lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, became a champion of the cause of
civil rights.123

115. Memorandum from Justice Robert Jackson (Feb. 15, 1954), quoted in KLUGER, supra
note 102, at 690.
116. KLUGER, supra note 102, at 690.
117. ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
118. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2000).
119. COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 117, at 78.
120. DUDZIAK, supra note 118, at 12.
121. COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 117, at 83-84.
122. Id. at 84-86.
123. Id. at 88.
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World War II forced more rapid change. The manpower demands of the
war brought more than one million African-Americans into the military, often
in combat and sometimes leadership roles that would have been inconceivable
only a few years earlier.124 At the same time, industry’s needs led to a great
migration that ultimately transformed the nation’s minority population “from
one that was largely rural and southern to one that was increasingly urban and
located in the more liberal North and West.”125 Cottrol, Diamond, and Ware
note that:
[The war also forced Americans] to take a hard, awful look at where racism
could lead. That look began when ordinary men, GIs in the European theater,
stumbled across not only the unbelievable but the inconceivable: killing
grounds with names like Dachau, Buchenwald, Malthausen. These camps left
an impression that would never be erased in the minds of the men who actually
walked through them, including their commanding general, Dwight D.
Eisenhower. The Nuremberg trials, as well as massive press coverage of Nazi
atrocities, served to inform the wider American public of the horrors of the
Third Reich’s Final Solution. All of this would help make the kind of easy yet
deep racial prejudice common earlier in the century far less respectable after
the Second World War.126

Popular culture changed as a result. Hollywood began to portray blacks as
equal and heroic,127 and Jackie Robinson’s integration of major league baseball
was “a turning point in the history of American race relations that should not
be underestimated.”128 Robinson made a hero of color a routine icon in
American life.
Slowly law and public policy began to change as well. President Franklin
Roosevelt was forced to appoint the first African-American general and to sign
a fair employment practices order barring discrimination in defense
industries.129 In 1948, his successor, Harry Truman, signed executive orders
barring discrimination in the federal civil service and in the military.130
Mary Dudziak picks up the story in detail where Cottrol, Diamond, and
Ware leave off. She shows how the Cold War struggle against Soviet Russia
was impeded by the continuation of racial injustice in America. One element
in the Cold War was to win the benevolent neutrality, if not the allegiance, of
what we now view as third world countries, most of whose people are dark-

124. Id. at 91-94.
125. Id. at 94.
126. COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 117, at 97. I have written at length about
these developments. See NELSON, supra note 72, at 119-47.
127. See COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 117, at 95-98.
128. Id. at 97.
129. Id. at 91.
130. Id. at 99.
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skinned.131 Dudziak shows how people from those nations were offended by
reports of discrimination against African-Americans in the United States, and
were angered when their own people arrived in Washington as government
representatives, in college towns as students, or in other cities as businessmen
and faced the same discrimination as dark Americans.132 She also shows how
the Communist press and media exploited racial incidents for propaganda
purposes.133
The impact of racial injustice on American foreign policy greatly troubled
State Department officials such as Chester Bowles, the ambassador to India.
In a 1952 speech, Bowles observed:
A year, a month, or even a week in Asia is enough to convince any perceptive
American that the colored peoples of Asia and Africa, who total two-thirds of
the world’s population, seldom think about the United States without
considering the limitations under which our 13 million Negroes are living.134

These third world people were “convinced that, solely because of their color,
many Americans are denied a fair share in the life of the richest nation on
earth, and in their ears this conviction gives our claim to world leadership a
distinctly hollow ring.”135 Confident that he had “not exaggerated” because it
was “impossible to exaggerate,”136 Bowles concluded: “How much does all
our talk of democracy mean, if we do not practice it at home? . . . How can the
colored peoples of Asia be sure we are sincere in our interest in them if we do
not respect the equality of our colored people at home?”137 As Dudziak shows,
numerous Americans, both in government and outside of government, were
conscious of and repeated Bowles’s central points. A key person was Supreme
Court Justice William O. Douglas, who, on a 1950 trip to India, was quickly
asked why America tolerated the lynching of blacks.138 When he published a
book about the trip the next year, Douglas wrote of “color consciousness” as
“an important consideration in the warmth of India’s relations to the outside
world” and of “the attitude of the United States toward its colored minorities
[as] a powerful factor in our relations with India.”139
More importantly, the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations brought
these matters to the attention of the Supreme Court in amicus curiae briefs filed
131. See DUDZIAK, supra note 118, at 26-27, 45-46.
132. See id. at 29-42.
133. See id. at 11-83.
134. Address of Chester Bowles, Yale University (1952), quoted in DUDZIAK, supra note
118, at 77.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 78.
137. Id.
138. DUDZIAK, supra note 118, at 105.
139. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, STRANGE LANDS AND FRIENDLY PEOPLE 296 (1951), quoted in
DUDZIAK, supra note 118, at 105.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

814

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:795

on behalf of the United States in the Brown litigation. One of these briefs
reminded the Court that “[i]t is in the context of the present world struggle
between freedom and tyranny that the problem of race discrimination must be
viewed.”140 The brief then quoted Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who said:
During the past six years, the damage to our foreign relations . . . has become
progressively greater. The United States is under constant attack in the foreign
press, over the foreign radio, and in such international bodies as the United
Nations because of various practices of discrimination against minority groups
in this country. As might be expected, Soviet spokesmen regularly exploit this
situation in propaganda against the United States, both within the United
Nations and through radio broadcasts and the press, which reaches all corners
of the world. Some of these attacks against us are based on falsehood or
distortion; but the undeniable existence of racial discrimination gives
unfriendly governments the most effective kind of ammunition for their
propaganda warfare.141

The brief concluded by stating that “the existence of discrimination against
minority groups in the United States has an adverse effect upon our relations
with other countries. Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist
propaganda mills, and it raises doubts even among friendly nations as to the
intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.”142
Thus the Court, as it was deciding Brown, had to appreciate that racial
conditions had changed since the time of Plessy v. Ferguson and that the
nation needed the Court to give constitutional sanction to the change. Just as
the Charlotte News would tell the people of North Carolina after Brown had
been decided, so too the Court itself in analyzing the case knew that it
“somehow . . . must keep the sweep of human history in [its] perspective, must
apply its intelligence coolly and dispassionately, and must find the resources
for giving all . . . children equality of education.”143 In short, the materials
existed for deciding Brown v. Board of Education in the dominant realist mode
of displaying how the Court was changing law in response to societal need. It
would have been easy for the Court to explain why, to avoid a pending train
wreck, the caboose had to remain attached to the train riding down the track of
equality.
Indeed, in his column in the New York Times published the day after the
Brown decision was handed down, James Reston tried to draft the opinion that
the Court might have written. Entitled A Sociological Decision, Reston
observed that the Court had “rejected history, philosophy and custom as the
140. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), quoted in DUDZIAK, supra note 118, at 79.
141. Id., quoted in DUDZIAK, supra note 118, at 100.
142. Id.
143. Editorial Statement of Charlotte News (quoted in BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, May 18,
1954, at 5), quoted in DUDZIAK, supra note 118, at 110.
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major basis for its decision and accepted instead Justice Benjamin N.
Cardoza’s [sic] test of contemporary social justice.”144 In a document that
“read more like an expert paper on sociology than a Supreme Court
opinion,”145 the decision, according to Reston:
[A]dded one more illustration to Justice Cardoza’s [sic] power of prophecy:
“When the social needs demand one settlement rather than another,” he said,
“there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice
custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends.
“From history and philosophy and custom, we pass, therefore, to the force
which in our day and generation is becoming the greatest of them all, the
power of social justice which finds its outlet and expression in the method of
sociology . . . .
“The final cause of law is the welfare of society . . . .”146

But the Brown opinion did not say what Reston’s column said, at least not
as thoroughly and eloquently. It did not identify itself as part of a line of
decisions growing out of Justice Cardozo’s method of sociology. Nor did it
emphasize the social facts, which Professors Cottrol, Diamond, Dudziak, and
Ware have so eloquently elaborated, that demanded an end to formal, de jure
segregation. Perhaps Brown would have been criticized as political rather than
legal if it had done so; indeed, the leading scholar of the case understands
Reston’s column to have so criticized it.147 But, in retrospect, it seems that the
Court did not even try to avoid criticism by arguing that it had to do what it
did. Why?
III
A.
We will never know for sure.148 Aware of the importance and sensitivity
of the case, the Justices were very secretive in their discussions about Brown.
They did not resolve the case in the conference meeting after argument, but in
subsequent, private, often one-on-one conversations.149 Thus, even the sketchy
conference notes kept by Justices Burton, Clark, Douglas, and Jackson do not
tell the full story.

144. James Reston, A Sociological Decision, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 14.
145. Id.
146. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Justice Cardozo).
147. See KLUGER, supra note 102, at 711.
148. Despite the title of his article, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education,
Mark Tushnet agrees. See Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 2, at 1868-69, 1884.
149. See KLUGER, supra note 102, at 683.
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We can begin to discern the story-line only by looking at two important
cases that occurred in the years leading up to Brown. When we do, we will
have a better understanding of why the Court did not rest the Brown opinion on
Cardozo’s jurisprudential approach. We also will come to see something
morally problematic about Cardozo’s method of sociology.
The first case was Korematsu.150 As I have already suggested, the six-man
majority (Justices Black, Stone, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Rutledge) had
grounded its decision on wartime military needs. But in this instance, pursuit
of Cardozo’s approach produced three vociferous dissents. I will make only
the briefest mention of two of the dissents by Justices Owen Roberts151 and
Frank Murphy,152 who labeled the internment policy racist, because neither
justice would be a member of the Brown court. I will focus on the third dissent
because I think it explains why its author, Justice Robert Jackson, reacted to
Brown as he did. And, Jackson’s reaction was profoundly important to the
form the Brown opinion took.
In Korematsu, Jackson was prepared to accept the claim of military
necessity. He wrote:
When an area is so beset that it must be put under military control at all, the
paramount consideration is that its measures be successful, rather than legal.
The armed services must protect a society, not merely its Constitution. The
very essence of the military job is to marshal physical force, to remove every
obstacle to its effectiveness, to give it every strategic advantage. Defense
measures will not, and often should not, be held within the limits that bind civil
authority in peace. . . .
But if we cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution, neither would
I distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient.
....
Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting and
detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial construction of
the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to
liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however
unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency. Even
during that period, a succeeding commander may revoke it all. But once a
judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transporting
American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an
150. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
151. Id. at 225.
152. Id. at 233.
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urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our own
law and thinking and expands it to new purposes. All who observe the work of
courts are familiar with what Judge Cardozo described as “the tendency of a
principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.” A military commander may
overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review
and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.
There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its
own image.153

Jackson accordingly urged that the judiciary should not interfere with the
military’s execution of its responsibilities for national defense by, for example,
enjoining the internment program.154 At the same time, he concluded that it
was wrong to allow society’s military needs to alter constitutional law.155 To
preserve the integrity156 of the legal caboose, he proposed that it be detached
from the societal train. Buried in his proposal was an awareness that, while
societal needs and values ultimately would dictate the course of politics,
something else had to determine the direction of the law.
Within a few years, it was plain that Justice Jackson had been right.
Korematsu was a grievous mistake. A year after the majority opinion came
down, it was subjected to intense criticism. Four years later, Congress enacted
the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act, which, in giving compensation
for some of the losses internees had suffered, implicitly recognized the wrong
that had been done.157 By the end of his career, at least one of the Justices in
the majority, William O. Douglas, had publicly admitted his error.158
Earl Warren was another leader who quickly concluded that the internment
of Japanese-Americans had been a mistake. Although he had played a more
active role than anyone else in instituting the relocation program,159 Warren
felt that “everybody who had anything to do with the relocation of the
Japanese, after it was all over, had something of a guilty consciousness about
it.”160 Warren, for one, “wanted to show that it wasn’t a racial thing” and to
justify it as “a defense matter,”161 but he was less than fully successful. As a
result, he stated in his memoirs that he “deeply regretted the removal order”

153. Id. at 244-46 (footnote omitted) (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 42, at 51).
154. Id. at 248.
155. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 247.
156. Integrity, of course, is Ronald Dworkin’s term of art, but no other word so aptly
describes the concept underlying Jackson’s Korematsu dissent. See DWORKIN, supra note 43, at
176-275.
157. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 348 (1983).
158. Id. at 362.
159. See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 74-75 (1982).
160. Interview with Earl Warren (1972), quoted in WHITE, supra note 159, at 76.
161. Id.
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and his own part “advocating it. . . . It was wrong to react so impulsively
without positive evidence of disloyalty.”162
All this made legal arguments about advancing societal needs somewhat
suspect, and when such arguments were offered in a major case that came to
the Court just one year before Brown, they were rejected.163 That case,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, arose in 1952 when the
administration of President Harry Truman, in the midst of the Korean War,
seized control of the nation’s steel mills in order to prevent a work stoppage
that it claimed would impede war efforts.164 It was the same argument of
military necessity that had been made in Korematsu and, in a sense, in Gobitis.
As Chief Justice Fred Vinson noted for himself and two other justices in
dissent, “the central fact of this case” was “that the Nation’s entire basic steel
production would have shut down completely if there had been no Government
seizure” and that such “a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and
imperil our national defense.”165 Vinson accordingly concluded that “if the
President has any power under the Constitution to meet a critical situation . . . ,
there is no basis whatever for criticizing the exercise of such power in this
case.”166 Like Cardozo, Vinson wanted to interpret the Constitution not as a
series of “doctrinaire concept[s],” but with “elasticity of adjustment, in
response to the practical necessities of government.”167
The majority of his colleagues, including four who would play key roles in
Brown—Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson—disagreed.
Justice Douglas, for one, had “no doubt that the emergency which caused the
President to seize these steel plants was one that bore heavily on the country.
But the emergency did not create power.”168 Thus, in Douglas’s view, the
Court could not decide the case in whatever fashion would “deal most
expeditiously with the present crisis” and could not “rewrit[e]” the
Constitution “to suit the political conveniences of the present emergency.”169
Justice Jackson was equally concerned that the Constitution not be
manipulated to promote a short-term national interest. It was vital, according
to Jackson, not “to emphasize transient results . . . and lose sight of enduring

162. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN (1977), quoted in
WHITE, supra note 159, at 76 (alteration in original).
163. The arguments also failed to claim the support of a majority of the Court in another
important mid-century case, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950), although they were
prominent in the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Vinson. See id. at 495-517.
164. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952).
165. Id. at 679 (internal quotations omitted).
166. Id. at 680.
167. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
168. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 630, 632.
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consequences upon the balanced power structure of our Republic.”170
Accordingly he concluded that:
[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate [was] more sinister and
alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely
uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over
the internal affairs of the country by his own commitment of the Nation’s
armed forces to some foreign venture.171

A third justice, Felix Frankfurter, began his analysis by recognizing that, of
course, the content of the Constitution was “not to be derived from an abstract
analysis” or in “disregard [of] the gloss which life has written upon” it.172 But,
in the end, quoting Justice Brandeis, he agreed with Justices Douglas and
Jackson that the Constitution was adopted “not to promote efficiency but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”173 Justice Black, writing the opinion
of the Court, similarly rejected the Administration’s claim that the meaning of
the Constitution should be altered “to avert a national catastrophe which would
inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production.”174
B.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube was decided in June 1952. Thus, when the
Court met in conference in December 1952, and then in December 1953, to
discuss Brown, Cardozo’s concept of societal need as a basis for judicial
decision-making was not in vogue among those in the room. Chief Justice
Vinson, the man who had been most willing to follow that approach in
Youngstown, was dead and had been replaced by Earl Warren.175
The new Chief Justice led off the discussion by reporting his morally
grounded conclusion:
[T]he principle of segregation and separate but equal rests upon the basic
premise that the Negro race is inferior. . . .
I don’t see how we can . . . set one group apart from the rest and say that they
are not entitled to exactly the same treatment as all others. To do so is contrary
to Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Those amendments
were intended to make those who were once slaves equal with all others.176

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 642.
Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610, 613.
Id. at 582.
THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 653 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (collection of
historical documents) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE].
176. Id. at 654.
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The senior member of the Court, Hugo Black, who was absent from the
1953 conference, had expressed an identical view during the conference
following the first argument of Brown in December 1952. He stated, “I am
compelled to say for myself that I can’t escape the view that the reason for
segregation is the belief that Negroes are inferior. I do not need books to say
that.”177 As he had known earlier, “segregation ‘was Hitler’s creed—he
preached what the South believed.’”178 Black, in the December 1952
discussion of Brown, then went on:
I am also compelled to say for myself that the Civil War Amendments have as
their basic purpose the abolition of such castes. . . .
If I have to meet it, I can’t go contrary to the truth that the purpose of these
laws is to discriminate on account of color. The Civil War Amendments were
intended to stop that.179

Justice Douglas, another key figure, agreed with Warren and Black. For
him, segregation was “a simple problem. Race and color cannot be a
constitutional standard for segregating the schools.”180 Justice Harold Burton
similarly agreed that “segregation violate[d] equal protection” and that it was
“not reasonable to educate people separately for a joint life.” Justice Burton
was prepared to “go the full length to upset segregation.”181 For Justice
Sherman Minton, the “only justification for segregation [was] the inferiority of
the Negro,” and the “Fourteenth Amendment, which was intended to wipe out
the badges of slavery and inferiority,” required “equal rights, not separate but
equal.”182
The moralistic approach of these five justices could have provided the
Court with a legally sound basis for its decision. It would only have required
the Court to find as a fact something that surely was true—that the purpose of
segregation was to discriminate against African-Americans—and to reach an
historical judgment that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments had been
intended to bar such discrimination. But the theory raised a problem—namely,
four of the justices were not prepared to accept it.
Chief Justice Warren’s most critical goal in Brown was achieving
“unanimity and uniformity, even if we have some differences.”183 Justice

177. Id. at 648.
178. Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 2, at 1888 (quoting conference Notes of Justice William
Douglas).
179. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 175, at 648.
180. Id. at 658.
181. Id. at 653.
182. Id. at 660.
183. Id. at 654; see also KLUGER, supra note 102, at 683.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION

821

Frankfurter, always a key member of the Court, agreed with Warren’s goal,184
and it became the driving force in the drafting of the opinion.185 The goal
compelled Warren, as he wrote the opinion, to refrain from making statements
that might antagonize other justices and lead them to dissent or to write
separate concurrences. As Justice Douglas, a firm vote in support both of
desegregation and of unanimity, suggested at the December 1953 conference
following reargument, achieving unanimity required that the opinion should
not “try to anticipate too much,” but should say as little as possible.186 Three
other justices who strongly favored desegregation—Hugo Black, Harold
Burton, and Sherman Minton—did not disagree.187
But unanimity did not, in fact, exist. Justice Stanley Reed disagreed that
segregation rested “on a theory of racial inferiority,”188 and a long line of cases
going back to Fletcher v. Peck cautioned against judicial inquiries into
legislative motive or purpose.189 Justice Frankfurter, moreover, questioned
“[h]ow . . . Black kn[e]w what the framers of the Civil War Amendments
meant.”190 Only six years earlier, Black had failed to persuade the majority on
a parallel claim that the original intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment’s

184. KLUGER, supra note 102, at 685. Indeed, Frankfurter might have been the originator of
the goal. See COTTROL , DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 117, at 162-63; Tushnet & Lezin, supra
note 2, at 1872.
185. Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 2, at 1876 n.51, 1877-78.
186. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 175, at 658.
187. See id. at 655-56, 658-60.
188. Id. at 656.
189. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810). Accord Arizona v. California,
283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931); O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 25758 (1931); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 210 (1921); Dakota Cent. Tel.
Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 187 (1919); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,
251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919); Wilson v. New, 243
U.S. 332, 358-59 (1917); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357, 366 (1916);
Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1915); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 53-59
(1904); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 102 (1899); United States
v. Des Moines Nav. & Ry. Co., 142 U.S. 510, 544-45 (1892). Several years after Brown, John
Hart Ely wrote about the “Supreme Court’s traditional confusion about the relevance of
legislative and administrative motivation in determining the constitutionality of governmental
action[],” John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1207 (1970), which Paul Brest called “one of the most muddled areas of our
constitutional jurisprudence.” Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 99.
190. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 175, at 651. As a result of his
concerns about the framers’ intentions, Frankfurter directed his law clerk, Alex Bickel, to conduct
a detailed inquiry. Bickel ultimately drafted a memorandum that showed the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment to be ambiguous, see KLUGER, supra note 102, at 653-55, which he later
published as Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
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framers directed the application of the Bill of Rights to the states.191 In short,
the theory that segregation rested on racial inferiority and that the Fourteenth
Amendment therefore outlawed it seemed unlikely to produce a unanimous
opinion.
Three justices presented Warren with particularly great problems in his
search for unanimity. Robert Jackson’s position, which was a reworking of
Cardozo’s sociological jurisprudence, was especially interesting and bears
quotation at length. According to Jackson:
Cardozo said that much of constitutional interpretation is partly statutory
construction and partly politics. This is a political question. To me personally,
this is not a problem. But it is difficult to make this other than a political
decision. . . . I don’t know how to justify the abolition of segregation as a
judicial act.
....
The problem is to make a judicial basis for a congenial political
conclusion. . . . As a political decision, I can go along with it—but with a
protest that it is politics.192

Thus, the suggestion was that Jackson would file a separate opinion if the
Court’s opinion rested on a strong legal argument or otherwise asserted too
much.
Justice Tom Clark, like Jackson, was willing to join a judgment
invalidating segregation. But on the issue of the form that the opinion should
take, Clark took a position opposite Jackson’s. In his view, the case could not
be handled “by a brief policy statement. There [was] a danger of violence if
this [was] not well handled.”193 The final justice, Stanley Reed, initially
announced that he would dissent from any decision outlawing segregation.194
Thus, there was no consensus, and the justices kept discussing the case
informally for several months. Chief Justice Warren did not begin writing the
Court’s opinions in Brown and in the companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe195
until April, but he worked quickly and circulated his opinions on May 7, with a
memo indicating that they “were prepared on the theory that the opinions
should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and,
above all, non-accusatory.”196 Justices Black, Douglas, Burton, Clark, and
Minton promptly joined the drafts. It was also clear that Justice Frankfurter

191. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
192. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 175, at 658.
193. Id. at 659.
194. Id. at 661.
195. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
196. Memorandum from Chief Justice Earl Warren (May 7, 1954), quoted in KLUGER, supra
note 102, at 696.
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would join, although perhaps after requesting changes in phraseology.197 That
left Justice Jackson, who had been hospitalized with a heart attack, as the key
vote.
Warren personally delivered his draft opinions to Jackson in the
hospital.198 When Warren left, Jackson read the opinion in Brown and, in the
words of his law clerk, was “greatly relieved.”199 When Jackson then asked his
clerk for his view, the clerk responded that he “wished that it had more law in
it but [he] didn’t find anything glaringly unacceptable in it.”200 The opinion’s
strength was that it was “simple and unobtrusive” and reflected a “keen sense”
of what could be said “without getting everybody’s back up.”201 Jackson
agreed to join the opinion in return for Warren’s adding a reference to the
success of African-Americans in many fields of endeavor202—a societal fact
important to a justice influenced by Cardozo and a fact about which, as we
have seen, Jackson had been concerned in a memo he had drafted shortly after
the Brown cases had been argued.
We might wonder why Jackson did not publish a concurring opinion or, at
least, insist on more concessions as the price for joining the Chief Justice’s
opinion. It appears that his heart attack slowed him down; moreover, as his
somewhat disjointed memo shows, he had no vision of what the reasoning
behind the Brown judgment ought to be. In any event, Warren’s opinion
contained no strong assertions of law of the sort to which Jackson had
indicated he would object, and hence there was little reason for him to object.
After visiting Jackson in the hospital on May 10, Justice Frankfurter also
joined Warren’s opinion.203 It is significant that Frankfurter joined as late as
he did, after all the other justices except Stanley Reed were on board. His
delay gave him less bargaining power. Of all the justices, Frankfurter
presumably was the one most likely to insist that the opinion contain legally
rigorous, reasoned arguments in support of its result. But Frankfurter also
cared about unanimity. To insist that the Chief Justice make significant
changes in his opinion would risk that others might withdraw their support
from any revised opinion. Frankfurter had little choice but to join.
With Frankfurter and Jackson aboard, only Stanley Reed was left. The
Chief Justice paid him a visit, emphasized the need for unanimity, and asked
Reed to reconsider.204 Reed did reconsider, and “[f]or the good of the country,

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See KLUGER, supra note 102, at 696-97.
Id. at 697.
Interview with Barrett Prettyman, quoted in KLUGER, supra note 102, at 697.
Id.
Id.
See KLUGER, supra note 102, at 697.
Id.
Id. at 698.
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he put aside his own basis for dissent.”205 Eight days after Warren had first
circulated his draft, the Court gave it final approval, and two days later, Chief
Justice Earl Warren announced it from the bench.206
Regrettably, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Brown, which took shape in
response to the moral concerns of several of the justices and to the Court’s
perception of the nation’s needs and changing values, was almost devoid of
reasoning, either moral or sociological. After outlining the procedural posture
of the case, the inconclusive history of the Fourteenth Amendment until its
definitive interpretation in Plessy v. Ferguson, and the importance of education
in Twentieth-Century American life, the Chief Justice finally came to the
question presented: “Does segregation of children in public schools solely on
the basis of race . . . deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities?”207 Relying on a trial court finding that
“[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children” that “affects the[ir]
motivation . . . to learn” and thereby tends to retard their “educational and
mental development,” the Court concluded that segregation was designed to
and did, in fact, “generate[] a feeling of inferiority . . . [on the part of AfricanAmerican children] that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.”208 The words were rhetorically powerful, but the legal
reasoning thin; nonetheless, Plessy was effectively overruled.
In particular, the novice Chief Justice, who had spent the last decade and
more of his career in high political office, from which he almost certainly had
not paid careful attention to legal realist arguments about whether law should
respond to changing societal values and needs,209 failed to make such
Cardozian arguments explicit in his opinion. He likewise failed to elaborate
the moral argument that had driven him to his result—that the purpose of
segregation was to keep African-Americans in a position of subordination and
that subordination is unconstitutional. His colleagues, perhaps out of respect
for their new Chief and perhaps out of fear of fracturing the unanimity of the
Court, did little to press the arguments on him.
Chief Justice Warren also placed little weight on precedent. He did cite
Sweatt v. Painter210 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher
Education,211 but his ability to rely on precedent was limited because the most
important precedent, Plessy v. Ferguson,212 supported the opposite result and
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Interview with George Mickum, quoted in KLUGER, supra note 102, at 698.
KLUGER, supra note 102, at 698.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Id. at 493-94 (internal quotation omitted).
Warren himself fully appreciated his limitations. See WHITE, supra note 159, at 159-60.
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
339 U.S. 637 (1950).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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thus had to be overruled, although he did not explicitly overrule it. Nor could
he rely on the legislative history of the Civil War Amendments because, as
Justice Frankfurter had insisted and the Brown opinion frankly admitted, the
legislative history was inconclusive.213 Finally, while Warren expressed the
conclusions of various psychologists about the relationship between
segregation and feelings of inferiority on the part of blacks,214 he presented the
conclusions as psychological fact rather than as legal principle. The end result
was an opinion with little reasoning of any sort on which to rely.
C.
In view of its lack of reasoning, the Chief Justice’s opinion in Brown v.
Board of Education became an easy target for the likes of Senator James
Eastland of Mississippi, who called it a “legislative decision by a political
court,”215 and Governor Herman Talmadge of Georgia, who accused the Court
of “ignor[ing] all law and precedent and usurp[ing] from the Congress and the
people the power to amend the Constitution, and from the Congress the
authority to make the laws of the land.”216 Meanwhile ninety-six members of
Congress were drafting the Southern Manifesto, which declared that the nine
justices had undertaken “to exercise their naked judicial power and substituted
their personal political and social ideas for the established law of the land.”217
These criticisms were not unique: “the Warren opinion in Brown
precipitated a constitutional firestorm the likes of which the nation had not
seen at least since the Taney opinion in Dred Scott.”218 Indeed, by the end of
the decade, the attack on Brown had reached into the academy. During a twoyear period, two cycles of the Holmes lectures delivered at Harvard Law
School and a response by a then-young professor at Yale, Louis H. Pollak, who
has honored us by participating in this symposium, brought the debate
regarding Brown, and the failings of the Chief Justice’s opinion, to the
forefront of academic thought. Significantly, we can see in the second lecture
and in Professor Pollak’s response, the emergence of the approach to judicial
decision-making that subsequently would be elaborated by Ronald Dworkin in
Law’s Empire.
The first of the two Holmes Lectures was given by Judge Learned Hand,
who levied the typical accusation that the Court had “assume[d] the role of a
213. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
214. See id. at 494, 494 n.11.
215. Statement of Senator James Eastland (Miss.), quoted in KLUGER, supra note 102, at 71011.
216. Statement of Governor Herman Talmadge (Ga.), quoted in KLUGER, supra note 102, at
710.
217. Southern Manifesto (March 12, 1956), quoted in COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra
note 117, at 187-88.
218. COTTROL, DIAMOND & WARE, supra note 117, at 210.
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third legislative chamber” by its decision in Brown.219 In Hand’s view, the
judicial power in constitutional cases extended no further than the enforcement
of specific, unambiguous textual provisions of the Constitution itself.220
Brown clearly was not such a case. Thus, Hand concluded that the Warren
Court had simply “‘overrule[d]’ the ‘legislative judgment’ of states by its own
reappraisal of the relative values at stake”221— that the Court had merely
engaged in the same process of weighing values that had produced segregation
in the first place.222
The second Holmes lecture was delivered by Professor Herbert Wechsler,
who sought to respond to Hand. The “problem” for Wechsler was not in the
result of Brown, but “strictly in the reasoning of the opinion.”223 Wechsler
understood that “courts in constitutional determinations face issues that are
inescapably ‘political’—political . . . in that they involve a choice among
competing values or desires.”224 What Wechsler, echoing Justice Jackson,
found crucial was “not the nature of the question but the nature of the answer
that may validly be given by the courts.”225 Courts, he argued, had to support
their “choice of values by the type of reasoned explanation . . . intrinsic to
judicial action.”226 Courts, in other words, had to choose values on the basis of
“neutral principles—by standards that transcend the case at hand.”227
219. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES,
1958, at 55 (1958) [hereinafter THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
220. The statement in the text was Hand’s main claim in the THE BILL OF RIGHTS, see id. at
48, 66-67, and in his first draft of his lecture, Hand did not mention Brown. However, his then
law clerk, Ronald Dworkin, who disagreed with Hand’s main claim, kept calling Hand’s attention
to Brown as a case demonstrating the error of that main claim. Dworkin convinced Hand that
Brown was too important to be ignored, and Hand also conceded that, if he had been on the
Supreme Court, he might well have joined the majority in Brown. But Hand, who had come to
maturity in the progressive era and had witnessed the New Deal’s battles against the Four
Horsemen, did not abandon his limited view of the Supreme Court’s role. And with the integrity
of Hercules (see DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 239) for whom Hand was the model, Hand
concluded that his principled view about the Court’s role had to dictate what he would say in his
lecture about Brown. Interview with Ronald M. Dworkin (Sept. 24, 2003). See also GERALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 664-72 (1994), which, in Dworkin’s
view, complements his recollection of how Hand came to analyze Brown as he did. For the
efforts of other law clerks to induce Hand, after he had delivered the THE BILL OF RIGHTS lecture,
to recognize the error of his approach, see Scott I. Messenger, Law Clerks and the Crafting of
Judicial Reputation: A Cultural History of a Legal Institution, at 33-36 (forthcoming 2004)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University).
221. THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 219, at 54.
222. See id. at 39.
223. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 32 (1959).
224. Id. at 15.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 15-16.
227. Id. at 17.
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When Wechsler examined Warren’s opinion, he found the result supported
only by lower-court fact findings and by a footnote reference to the work of
sociologists.228 Perhaps, some neutral principle undergirded the opinion, but
Wechsler could not find the principle because Warren had not expressed it.
Thus, for Wechsler, Brown v. Board of Education reflected a political and not
a legal judgment. But he opened up the possibility that Brown could be
rendered legitimate if someone could provide a legal reason for its political
result.229
Louis Pollak jumped into the opening by crafting a doctrinally solid
alternative to Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in his article, Racial
Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler.230
Pollak made the point that others had made—that the policy underlying
segregation laws was “the impermissible one of nourishing race prejudice.”231
But in his alternative to the Chief Justice’s opinion, Pollak also wrote:
“All others can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds
to it?” We see little room for doubt that it is the function of Jim Crow laws to
make identification as a Negro a matter of stigma. Such governmental
denigration is a form of injury the Constitution recognizes and will protect
against.232

Moreover, the opinion Pollak drafted for the Brown Court did not rest on this
observation alone. It rested as well on a legal point that all “‘restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.’”233
That suspicion could be overcome only by showing that the states had a
legitimate and compelling policy reason for the restriction, and, in the case of
segregation, no such reason existed. On the contrary, as Pollak had shown and
everybody knew, the reason for segregation was not a legitimate one at all.
The opinion that then Professor, now Judge Pollak wrote for the Court was
a powerful early statement of the two-tier equal protection analysis with which
we have become so familiar. Segregation laws, as racial classifications,
triggered strict scrutiny and put the burden of proof on the Southern states to

228. See Wechsler, supra note 223, at 32-33.
229. A decade later Wechsler concluded that Brown and subsequent cases had come to stand
for the “principle . . . that any racial line, implying an invidious assessment, may no longer be
prescribed by law or by official action.” On that basis, he found “[t]he decision . . . more
acceptable.” Herbert Wechsler, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 12 TEX.
Q. 10, 23 (1969).
230. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Welchsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
231. Id. at 26.
232. Id. at 28 (citations omitted) (quoting Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37
(1922) and citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)).
233. Id. at 27 (quoting Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
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demonstrate the legitimacy of their laws. It was a burden the South obviously
could not meet. Hence their laws were unconstitutional.
Pollak’s article thus provided an easy and elegant solution to the problem
of justifying the Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education. He might
have ended the article with that solution. But he did not. He also tacked on a
three-page conclusion, the thrust of which is central to the thesis of this Article.
The conclusion asked what Wechsler meant by “neutral principles.”234 Did
Wechsler require only that judges write opinions that were “disinterested,
reasoned, and comprehensive of the full range of like constitutional issues” and
that “plainly and fully articulate[d] the real bases of decision”?235 If so, the
opinion Pollak drafted for Brown presumably would have satisfied Wechsler’s
criteria. Pollak suspected, however, that Wechsler meant more.236 He
suspected Wechsler also meant that judges ought “‘not draw’” on their
“‘merely personal and private notions’” but should “‘achieve . . .
objectivity.’”237 If so, Pollak disagreed. In his view, “judicial neutrality” did
“not preclude the disciplined exercise by a Supreme Court Justice of that
Justice’s individual and strongly held philosophy.”238 Indeed, he appears to
have understood that judges could not decide anything without recourse to
their “individual . . . philosophy.”239
With Judge Pollak’s article, we enter the latter part of the Twentieth
Century—the jurisprudential era dominated by Ronald Dworkin rather than
Benjamin Cardozo. I lack the evidence to claim that Pollak’s article caused
others to change the way they thought about the role of judges in constitutional
adjudication. But, at the very least, it reflected a new way that a young
generation of academics, like Pollak’s soon-to-be colleague Dworkin,240 were
beginning to think.241

234. Id. at 32.
235. Pollak, supra note 230, at 32.
236. See id. at 33.
237. Id. at 34 (quoting Rochin v. Californai, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.)).
238. Id. at 33.
239. Id.
240. Dworkin, who joined the faculty of Yale Law School in 1962, had already begun
thinking about Brown when, as Learned Hand’s law clerk, he had argued with Hand while the
judge was writing his lecture, published as THE BILL OF RIGHTS, in which Hand questioned the
Court’s opinion in Brown. See THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 219, at 54-55. Dworkin then
had understood that any jurisprudential theory capable of attaining widespread assent had to be
consistent with Brown, and thus, when he came to elaborate his own theory in Law’s Empire,
Brown became one of the four cases on which he focused his attention. See DWORKIN, supra
note 43, at 15-30, 381-89.
241. Another academic who wrote in response to Hand and Wechsler, suggesting that a
lawful basis for the Brown opinion did exist, was Charles Black. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). Black observed what Hugo
Black had stated in conference eight years earlier—that the Fourteenth Amendment provided
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In what ways did this young generation reject Cardozo and develop a new
jurisprudence? There were two. First, they rejected Cardozo’s assumption that
judges or even social scientists could objectively determine society’s needs and
values. Pluralism and relativism became dominant in American thought, as
“[p]hilosophers made the idea of an objective social science increasingly
untenable.”242 Thus, Robert A. Dahl’s A Preface to Democratic Theory,
published three years before Pollak’s article, grounded democracy in
pluralism,243 while three years after Pollak’s article, Thomas S. Kuhn
published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which maintained that, even
in the physical sciences, the relativistic assumptions of researchers
significantly impacted their results.244 For legal academics attuned to these
developments in other disciplines, Cardozo’s jurisprudence became
implausible.
Second, the young academics placed their faith in individual moral
judgment. The decade of the 1960s would be the era of youthful protest
carried out not because society wanted it or had expressed any need for it, but
because the protesters could not morally tolerate society’s impositions on
them. Many in the legal academy applauded, or at least tolerated, morally
grounded protest;245 indeed, the problem that required explanation was not
individual moral protest, but opposition to protest.246
By the 1960s, Brown v. Board of Education had become central in the
thinking of these young academics. It had become the “big” case that could
not be ignored; no theory of the judicial function was acceptable unless it
explained why Brown had been rightly decided. Brown has remained a “big”
case ever since and the progenitor of a vast scholarly literature.247

“that the Negro race, as such, is not to be significantly disadvantaged by the laws of the states”
and that “segregation is a massive intentional disadvantaging of the Negro race, as such, by state
law.” On this “awkwardly simple” “scheme of reasoning,” Brown’s judgment, in Professor
Black’s view, could be sustained. Id.
In stating the obvious in print for the first time—something that Earl Warren’s desire to obtain the
Court’s unanimous support had precluded him from saying—Charles Black was seen in 1960 as
having made an important contribution to the debate over the lawfulness of Brown. But we now
know that Charles Black added nothing analytically that Hugo Black had not already contributed,
and accordingly I have not discussed his article in the text.
242. PURCELL, supra note 32, at 267-68. See generally id. at 197-217, 235-66.
243. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
244. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
245. Laura Kalman provides an in-depth discussion of this in her forthcoming book
documenting the important events that took place at the Yale Law School during the 1960s (Univ.
of N.C. Press, forthcoming 2005) (title not yet available).
246. This was the problem that Robert M. Cover set out to address in his book, JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
247. A comprehensive recent bibliography can be found in Balkin, supra note 3, at 237-42.
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It is, of course, impossible to explore all of this literature within the scope
of a single article, and it would serve no point to do so. The point I want to
make can be seen simply by examining a recent book in which nine leading
scholars of constitutional law offer suggestions for how the Court should have
drafted the Brown opinion.248 I will put aside the draft proposed by Derrick
Bell, to which I will return later, and concentrate for now on the other eight.
These eight, in common, strive to present either traditional doctrinal analyses
in support of Brown or philosophical justifications grounded in political
morality. None of the eight make arguments grounded in Cardozo’s method of
sociology.249
Two of the proposed drafts—by John Hart Ely and Cass Sunstein—rely on
the two-tier equal protection analysis first advanced by Judge Pollak in his
1959 response to Herbert Wechsler. Starting, as did Pollak, from Korematsu v.
United States,250 they argue that segregation laws, as racial classifications,
triggered strict scrutiny and put the burden of proof on the Southern states to
demonstrate the legitimacy of their laws.251 They conclude that the South’s
failure to meet that burden rendered its segregation laws unconstitutional.252
Michael McConnell tells a different legalist story—an originalist one. He
asserts that Congress’s passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which
outlawed segregation on common carriers and in public accommodations,253
demonstrates that when Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment in
1866 it understood the amendment to prohibit segregation.254 Although I find
McConnell’s originalist argument less than compelling,255 the important point

248. See Balkin, supra note 3.
249. Another collection of proposed alternative opinions to that of the Court in Brown
appeared in a 1995 symposium volume on Brown v. Board of Education. See 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1
(1995). All of the proposed opinions in the symposium take the same approaches as the eight
opinions in Balkin’s book discussed in the text.
250. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
251. See John Hart Ely, in Balkin, supra note 3, at 135, 135-42; Cass R. Sunstein, in Balkin,
supra note 3, at 174, 174-84.
252. See Ely, supra note 251, at 137-39; Sunstein, supra note 251, at 179-80.
253. Michael W. McConnell, in Balkin, supra note 3, at 158, 164.
254. See McConnell, supra note 253, at 158-73.
255. McConnell himself admits that the evidence from the 1866 debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment is ambiguous and that “[i]t is impossible to tell, from this evidence, whether the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted to require desegregation.” See id.
at 162. I have shown elsewhere that the framers did indeed have mixed views on the issue of
segregation, but that their ambivalence was not, for them, a problem. See WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 133-36
(1988). The Fourteenth Amendment was not written as an explicit directive to the Supreme Court
about the meaning and limits of the principle of equality, but as an authorization to future
Congresses to make political judgments about the application of the equality principle. See id. at
54. Thus, the ambiguity in the Fourteenth Amendment only increased the freedom that the
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for present purposes is that he, like everyone else who is striving to justify the
outcome in Brown, finds it necessary to turn to some jurisprudential approach
other than Cardozo’s method of sociology.
Drew Days and Catharine MacKinnon agree with McConnell that the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment must be found in its history, but they
make only a very general claim about what that history shows. They claim that
the Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment intended to make
African-Americans equal citizens of the United States and to prohibit racial
discrimination against them.256 Days and MacKinnon then adopt the
observation first made by Justice Black that the purpose and effect of
segregation was to disadvantage African-Americans and to keep them at the
bottom of a racist hierarchy.257
That leaves three other draft opinions—by Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin,
and Frank Michelman.258 In essence, all three eschew analysis of specific
doctrinal and factual issues and strive to elaborate the design of the
“democratic republic contemplated by our Reconstruction Constitution,”259 if
not by the Constitution of 1787 itself. What follows are Michelman’s words,
which easily could have been written by Ronald Dworkin, regarding the
decision to outlaw racial segregation in all its forms throughout the United
States. He explained:
[The decision] finally comes to rest on an attribution of national purpose and
commitment for which no internal legal-textual or textual-historical
demonstration can be found. Decision becomes a matter of attributing or not
attributing to the Constitution, from its very beginnings, an overriding purpose
and premise of excluding caste institutions from these shores, a premise that
most Americans today doubtless would trace to the Declaration of
Independence.260

So understood, Brown reaffirms a deep philosophical understanding of what
America, as a nation, is about.
IV
At this point, it might be useful to summarize my historical tale. In 1921,
Benjamin N. Cardozo published The Nature of the Judicial Process, in which
he argued that judges, at bottom, should base their decisions on the needs and
Congressmen who adopted it gave to themselves in the future. What is unclear is whether the
39th Congress meant to give future justices of the Supreme Court comparable freedom.
256. See Drew S. Days, III, in Balkin, supra note 3, at 92, 92-99; Catharine A. MacKinnon, in
Balkin, supra note 3, at 143, 154.
257. See Days, supra note 256, at 92-99; MacKinnon, supra note 256, at 148-51.
258. See Bruce Ackerman, in Balkin, supra note 3, at 100; Jack M. Balkin, in Balkin, supra
note 3, at 77; Frank I. Michelman, in Balkin, supra note 3, at 124.
259. Ackerman, supra note 258, at 116.
260. Michelman, supra note 258, at 130.
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values of society viewed as a whole.261 Cardozo’s approach remained
dominant into the early 1950s, was known to the justices who decided Brown
v. Board of Education, and contributed to the unanimous result to which they
came. But Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court did not clearly and
articulately express this method of sociology. And, when the Chief Justice’s
opinion was criticized, no one turned to that method to blunt the criticism.
Scholars defended Brown on other grounds. The ultimate defense, grounded in
what Cardozo called the method of philosophy,262 reads the Constitution as a
reflection of “an overriding purpose and premise of excluding caste institutions
from these shores.”263
A.
This history, I believe, contains two lessons. I already have hinted at the
first. This lesson is that Cardozo’s method of sociology—the method of
conforming law to the needs and values of society—is intrinsically
progressive, although never radical. In contrast, Dworkin’s approach of
permitting judges to rely on their understanding of sound political morality
allows them to engage in radical as well as progressive change. It also
legitimates judicial decisions that are conservative or even reactionary.
Cardozo’s approach is progressive in the sense that it ensures that as
society changes the law will change in tandem. If, as typically happens, people
look back on the social change that has occurred as progress, they will also
view the law that both contributed and responded to the change as progressive.
This is a cheap argument, but it is not unimportant. I do not know, for
example, whether societal changes during the course of the Twentieth Century
that have disconnected sexual activity from reproduction ultimately represent
progress or sin. But most people who look back on the Twentieth Century tend
to think that life was better at the end than at the beginning of the century; they
tend, that is, to think of the Twentieth Century as a time of progress. And legal
decisions that promoted or ratified that progress, such as Griswold v.
Connecticut,264 Roe v. Wade,265 and Lawrence v. Texas,266 similarly are viewed
as progressive.
It is possible to reach a similar judgment about progress toward racial
justice.267 No one can doubt that socio-political changes during the course of

261. See supra text accompanying notes 45-57.
262. See CARDOZO, supra note 42, at 30-50.
263. Michelman, supra note 258, at 130.
264. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
265. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
266. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
267. My own political morality informs me that nondiscrimination, integration, and equality
are positive goods, but I also know that people from other times and other cultures would
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the Twentieth Century made it essential for the United States to pursue a path
of racial equality. At the outset of the century, the United States was under no
military threat from foreign powers, because the British navy controlled the
seas and Britain had no interest in invading.268 Moreover, America was
economically self-sufficient.269 Today, on the other hand, we must import
essential goods from overseas and can protect ourselves from foreign attack
only by being the strongest military power in the world.270 Isolationism no
longer is possible; we must be part of—indeed, we must be the leader of—a
global community that consists overwhelmingly of people of color. Such
leadership, in turn, requires fair and equal treatment of racial and ethnic
minorities at home.
The amicus briefs of the United States in Brown v. Board of Education
explicated this connection between American global responsibility and
domestic racial justice.271 Taken together, the amicus briefs showed that the
national interest of the American people required racial justice and opportunity
for people of color—that people of color in the United States had to lead good
lives so that people of color elsewhere in the world could believe that America
wanted them to lead good lives as well.272 And the justices, most of whom still
were familiar with Cardozo’s approach of conforming law to the nation’s
needs and values, knew they had to decide Brown as they did.
The utility of Cardozo’s approach, even after decades of disuse, emerged
last Term with special poignancy in the case of Grutter v. Bollinger.273 There,
the amicus briefs of corporate leaders and retired military officers,274 along
with the narrow 5-4 majority opinion by Justice O’Connor, explicated even
more clearly than did Brown the connection between American global
hegemony and domestic racial justice. Relying on the briefs, the majority
opinion noted that “major American businesses have made clear that the skills
needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed
disagree with me if they could be here to express their moral views. And, I doubt whether we
could agree on any transcendent moral perspective that would resolve the dispute among us.
268. See PATRICK CALLAHAN, LOGICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORIES OF
AMERICA’S WORLD ROLE 55 (2004).
269. See id.
270. See Anne W. Branscomb, A Special Symposium: The New Technology in the
Communications Industry: Legal Problems in a Brave New World, 36 VAND. L. REV. 985, 989
(1983); CALLAHAN, supra note 268, at 55.
271. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3-8, 31-32, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8).
272. See id.
273. 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003).
274. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses, Grutter v. Bollinger,
123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516); Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae,
Grutter (Nos. 02-241, 02-516); Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as
Amici Curiae, Grutter (Nos. 02-241, 02-516).
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through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”275
Even more significantly, Justice O’Connor observed that the military needed to
“‘train and educate a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a
racially diverse setting’” and that it could not do so “‘unless the service
academies and the ROTC use[] limited race-conscious recruiting and
admissions policies.’”276
Taken together, the briefs and the O’Connor opinion suggest not only that
Americans of color must lead good lives so that people of color elsewhere in
the world can believe that America wants them to lead good lives as well, but
two further points. First, white Americans need black Americans to tell the
world about the good lives they lead and about America’s desire that people of
color throughout the world should buy American products and thereby lead
prosperous lives as well. Second, Americans of color need to be coopted to
perform many of the lower-paying, less-desirable tasks, such as military
service, that the maintenance of American global hegemony requires. Finally,
the amicus briefs and the O’Connor opinion intimate that whites need to create
an elite of color to persuade average Americans of color to assume these two
tasks.
I must note, parenthetically, that I agree with Justice Ginsburg’s approach
to affirmative action.277 I tend to regard it as an essential, though far from
perfectly adequate, remedy for past and ongoing racial discrimination that has
made it impossible for most Americans of color to compete on fair terms. I
imagine it would have been catastrophic for Grutter to have outlawed the
University of Michigan Law School’s admission system. Unfortunately,
though, Justice O’Connor did not see the issue as I do, and O’Connor, not I,
had the fifth vote. Moreover, what her opinion implies is true: whites do need
blacks to perform the functions she suggests for them, and we probably need
the “‘highly qualified, racially diverse’”278 leaders that only affirmative action
programs can produce to persuade the black underclass to do their necessary
jobs. I cannot, in short, gainsay the power of Cardozo’s method of sociology
to produce plausible, progressive, and maybe even right results.
It is equally significant that Cardozo’s jurisprudence will not be of help to
a justice wishing to dissent from results like those reached in Brown and
Grutter. A judge wishing to dissent, like either Stanley Reed in Brown or
Clarence Thomas in Grutter, will need to do so for other reasons—essentially
reasons of political morality.

275. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2340.
276. Id. (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al., supra note 274,
at 5, 29).
277. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 2442 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
278. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2340 (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr.,
supra note 274, at 27).
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Justice Reed had such a reason, wrongheaded as it might have been. As I
understand Reed, he simply believed that African-Americans were inferior to
European-Americans. “Of course,” Reed conceded, “there is no ‘inferior
race,’” but he did believe there were “racial differences” and that blacks “may
be handicapped.”279 “The race came out of slavery a short time ago,” Reed
noted, and “have not thoroughly assimilated. . . . We must try our best to give
Negroes benefits.”280 As I analyze the subtext of what I have just quoted, I
cannot help but see Reed thinking of whites as benevolent parents of childlike
blacks who need white help so that they might someday transcend racial
differences and become the equals of whites. However, they were not yet
equal, and while they were inferior it made sense to keep them separate. In
short, I understand Justice Reed’s paternalism to reflect a deep belief in racial
inequality—a belief grounded in a philosophical position.
In his dissent in Grutter, Justice Thomas likewise expressed a
philosophical point of view, albeit a different one from Justice Reed’s. He
quoted an especially eloquent statement of Frederick Douglass:
“[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always more that is benevolent, I
perceive, than just, manifested toward us. What I ask for the negro is not
benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The American people
have always been anxious to know what they shall do with us. . . . I have had
but one answer from the beginning. Do nothing with us! . . . If the apples will
not remain on the tree of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the core,
if they are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! . . . And, if the negro
cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give him a chance
to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! . . . [Y]our interference is doing him
positive injury.”281

As I understand Justice Thomas’s morally driven position, he sees AfricanAmericans as in all respects the equals of European-Americans, and believes
that their equality would manifest itself if whites would only stop oppressing
them, at times by trying to help them.
We know how Justice Thomas voted in Grutter v. Bollinger, and we know
how Justice Reed would have voted if Chief Justice Warren had not persuaded
him, for the good of the nation, to change his vote. Conservative and even
reactionary positions such as theirs will be articulated from the bench routinely
if the justices understand their job to be one of elaborating what they, as
philosophers, attribute to the Constitution as its core purpose. For this reason,
I am troubled by the shift in academic thinking away from Cardozo’s view that
law should be attuned to society’s emerging needs and values. I am concerned

279. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 175, at 656.
280. Id. at 649.
281. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2350 (quoting Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An
Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts (Jan. 26, 1865)).
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that, as people with a moral perspective on the law that differs from mine
increasingly set the Supreme Court’s agenda, results favored by the dissenting
justices in Grutter and the silent dissenter in Brown will become increasingly
commonplace.
B.
Earlier, when I was discussing the recent book in which nine eminent
constitutional law scholars proposed drafts of opinions that they think the
Supreme Court should have announced in Brown, I noted that I was passing by
the proposal of my colleague, Derrick Bell, and that I would return to it later.
It is now time to return to an opinion that Bell labeled a dissent.
Bell does something that major constitutional theorists beginning with
Charles Black and Lou Pollak have not done in their efforts to champion
Brown’s result. He notes the role that Cardozo’s method of sociology played
in the Court’s decision. In his words:
While it is nowhere mentioned in the majority’s opinion, it is quite clear that a
major motivation for the Court to outlaw racial segregation now when it
declined to do so in the past is the major boost this decision will provide in our
competition with communist governments abroad and our fight to uproot
subversive elements at home.282

From this Bell drew that more fundamental conclusion that the rights of
African-Americans “are recognized and protected for only so long as they
advance the nation’s interests.”283
Bell’s conclusion can appropriately be seen as an indictment of Cardozo’s
method of sociology, as well as Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter v.
Bollinger and the underlying judgmental processes of the Court in Brown v.
Board of Education. Put simply, Bell understands, as did Frederick Douglass
and Justice Clarence Thomas, that white Americans have always used AfricanAmericans to advance white interests, even when whites think they are acting
benevolently. When judges ask what the nation (that is, the nation’s vast white
majority) needs and values, they never confer permanent rights on blacks, but
merely confer temporarily privileges that endure only for so long as the nation
needs them.284 Grutter v. Bollinger, for example, confers no right on any
African-American student to attend the University of Michigan Law School; it
merely allows the law school to admit blacks on different standards than
whites as long as the good of the law school or the nation requires.
Professor Bell, along with Justice Thomas, finds this perverse. As
proponents of equality, they believe that African-Americans, like all other
Americans, should possess rights that will endure even after those rights no
282. Derrick A. Bell, in Balkin, supra note 3, at 185, 193.
283. Id.
284. See id.
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longer suit the convenience of the majority.285 Bell and Thomas do not see
whites, as a racial group, being used to promote the good of the nation. They
believe, quite correctly, that using blacks, even benevolently, marks blacks as
less than fully equal.286
Thinkers like Ronald Dworkin and Frank Michelman avoid this concern.
Through philosophical analysis of the history of American constitutionalism,
Dworkin derives an “individual right not to be the victim of official, stateimposed racial discrimination,”287 while Michelman, with a similar analysis,
“attribut[es] . . . to the Constitution, from its very beginnings, an overriding
purpose and premise of excluding caste institutions from these shores.”288
Both theories are racially neutral and should give neither Professor Bell,
Justice Thomas, nor anyone who hopes for racial equality cause to criticize
them. This neutrality justifies, and might even explain, why the Supreme
Court and academic commentators, in Brown and its aftermath, shifted away
from Cardozo’s method of sociology to an approach more like the method of
philosophy.
C.
This approach brings us yet again to Grutter v. Bollinger. For Bell,
Dworkin, Michelman, and Thomas, Grutter should represent a truly perverse
decision. White Americans need African-Americans to fight their wars for
them. They also need nonwhites to sell their products to people of color
overseas so as to maintain their own high living standards at home.
Continuing to so use African-Americans, in turn, necessitates the education
and training of a black elite, which, finally, requires preferential admissions to
the nation’s leading colleges and graduate schools.
One side of me rebels at hearing this reasoning. But the other side of me
wonders whether any other reasoning could have produced the results in
Brown and Grutter—results to which I am totally committed. Derrick Bell,
Ronald Dworkin, Frank Michelman, and Clarence Thomas all stand committed
to the principle of equality. But they have different conceptions of equality,
and they will not resolve their differences by engaging each other in
philosophic conversation. The conception of equality that will dominate the
Court’s reasoning will be the one most acceptable to the vast majority of the
American people, and the American people have never been able to concede
real equality to the descendants of those brought here as slaves.
Maybe whites can be benevolent, however, to the African-Americans
whom they need to protect their wealth and safety. And over time, perhaps,
285.
286.
287.
288.

See id. at 196.
See id.
DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 382.
Michelman, supra note 258, at 130.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

838

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:795

white benevolence might so enrich and empower blacks, as it has so many
other groups in the past, that they will be enabled to seize the equality that
whites have refused freely to grant.
V
Some may find me unduly optimistic,289 but I do not mean to insist on my
optimism. I have only one main conclusion—that since the time of Brown,
both conservative and liberal jurists have tended to ground their decisions more
on principles of political morality than on their perception of societal need.
Because no one set of political principles ever has become permanently
triumphant in pluralistic America, it follows that, if courts are charged with
deciding cases on the basis of principle, they sometimes will reach liberal and
other times conservative results.
Alternatively, judges might ground decisions not on abstract principle but
on their understanding of society’s needs, as Justice Cardozo and others did
beforeBrown and as Justice O’Connor did in Grutter v. Bollinger. Of course,
society sometimes can be divided into conflicting groups that do not agree on
what is needed, and, even when there is general agreement, it might be difficult
to determine what society’s needs are. Hence judges can make mistakes. But
often, as in Grutter, it is easy to know what is needed, and other times, when
mistakes are made, as in Bowers v. Hardwick,290 it is possible to correct
them.291 In the end, legal change will follow in the wake of social change, and
the law will appear progressive even when judges, perhaps benevolently,
authorize use of the underprivileged to further the well-being of society as a
whole.
I do not know whether, if I were a judge, I would base my decisions on my
perception of society’s needs and values or on my analysis of right political
morality. Because I am not and never will be a judge, I have not had to face
the question under the real-life conditions of having to give judgment. My job,
as an academic scholar, is not to prescribe, but only to describe and analyze
and thereby help my audience achieve new insight into matters of importance.
I hope I have done that for you.

289. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Brown and the Idea of Progress in American Legal History:
A Comment on William Nelson, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 851 (2004).
290. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
291. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986)).

